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2



BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE
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CURRENT
ANALYSES

(U) CHINA: AN EXHIBITION IN BEIJING
ON "US-CHIANG CRIMES"

Summary

(C) An exhibition opened this winter at Beijing's Capital Museum commemorating the alleged massacre of more than 300 revolutionaries by "US-Chiang special agents" on the eve of the Communist capture of Chongqing in 1949. The Chinese broadcast service Xinhua said that the exhibit showed "the atrocities of US reactionaries and the Chiang Kai-shek clique in the concentration camp of the 'Sino-American Cooperation Organization' (SACO)." The exhibition's opening coincided with the peak of the spiritual pollution campaign and with Beijing's protests against the Pell resolution calling for peaceful settlement of Taiwan's future and the language on Taiwan in the international financial institutions appropriations bill.^{1/}

(C) It is difficult to determine the foreign policy significance of such an exhibit in Beijing at this time. The subliminal message suggests

1/ (U) The Pell resolution, passed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on November 15, 1983, expressed the sense of the Senate that Taiwan's future should be settled peacefully, free of coercion, and in a manner acceptable to the people on Taiwan and consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act. An appropriations bill for international financial institutions, passed by the Senate on November 17 and the House on November 18, 1983, referred in one subsection to Taiwan as the Republic of China and declared that Taiwan's membership in the Asian Development Bank should remain unaltered even if China became a member.

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- ii -

suspicion of both Taipei and Washington and their intentions in dealing with China and thus questions the wisdom of compromising with either. In the context of the spiritual pollution campaign, the Chinese could have made their point about imperfect protection of human rights in the "bourgeois" West without sending a message so much at odds with China's current policy of stressing common interests.

(C) It is unlikely that an exhibition with these foreign policy implications would be held without approval at the highest level. It therefore may be a symptom of internal pressure on Deng and his colleagues, who have been associated with a policy of accommodation with the Kuomintang (KMT) leadership on Taiwan and of long-term Sino-US cooperation.

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(C) The Beijing Exhibition

The exhibition presents materials that had been on display for some years at the Sino-American Cooperation Exhibition Center outside Chongqing, SACO headquarters during World War II. The exhibit features instruments of torture and handcuffs allegedly from the US as well as photographs, including those of buildings in the SACO compound, alleged American SACO personnel, and bodies of Communist "martyrs" said to have been murdered at the SACO compound or by SACO-trained agents. When the exhibition opened on November 27, the 34th anniversary of the massacre, it received prominent play in Xinhua broadcasts and in the Beijing press. A visiting Embassy officer found it crowded with people obviously on tours sponsored by their work units and with elementary school students busily taking notes for their homework compositions.

(U) Background on SACO

The Sino-American Co-operative Organization was created in 1943 to channel US aid to Nationalist guerrillas in the war against Japan. It was directed by Gen. Tai Li, head of the KMT secret police, and Commodore Milton Miles, who headed the US Naval Group (China) and was then in charge of Office of Strategic Services (OSS) operations in China. Some 2,700 Americans served with SACO between April 1943 and the conclusion of its activities after the end of World War II. According to a well-documented account of SACO,^{2/} the equipment and training that it provided to KMT guerrilla forces and Tai Li's secret police were directed against the Communists as well as the Japanese.

Miles, who was ardently pro-KMT and anti-Communist, was a maverick who operated on the fringe of US policy. Both Gen. Joseph Stilwell, the US theater commander, and OSS Director General William Donovan were repelled by the brutality of some of Tai Li's henchmen and tried to gain control of SACO. Donovan relieved Miles of his OSS status in December 1943, but Miles maintained the independence of the US Naval Group until Stilwell's successor, Gen. Albert Wedemeyer, brought it under his nominal control in

^{2/} (U) Michael Schaller, The U.S. Crusade in China, 1938-1945. New York: Columbia University Press, 1979.

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- 2 -

April 1945. Wedemeyer tried to curtail SACO's activities but did not succeed in ending them until Miles was recalled to Washington in September after suffering a nervous breakdown.

Navy records indicate that US participation in SACO dwindled rapidly after Miles' departure and had ended on or before the formal disbandment of the US Naval Group on September 30, 1946. The 1949 massacre, which the exhibition commemorates, occurred at the compound outside Chongqing that had been SACO's headquarters during the war but apparently had been converted into a Nationalist prison camp after the war. The initial Communist reports of the massacre in December 1949 stated that more than 500 Nationalist political prisoners had been killed just before Chongqing fell. The reports did not mention SACO or charge the US with involvement.

Why Now?

(C) Although SACO may seem to be an obscure footnote in the history of Sino-American relations, it is by no means obscure in Beijing's eyes. Tai Li's activities and SACO's connection with him were well known to the Chinese leaders during the war. The 1949 massacre certainly was known to Deng Xiaoping, one of the leaders of the army that captured Chongqing. In any event, Michael Schaller's book came to the attention of Beijing leaders some months ago. Hu Yaobang told a visitor in early April 1983 that he had just read it, and a People's Daily review of it soon afterward made the point that US policymakers should learn from the unfortunate results of US wartime support for the KMT and opposition to the Communists.

(C) During the anti-Lin Biao and anti-Confucius campaign in 1974, alleged SACO atrocities were the targets of attack in rallies and broadcasts in Chongqing and Gwizhou, themselves part of a series of local rallies and broadcasts denouncing foreign atrocities in violently xenophobic terms. The present exhibit and press reports are milder in tone than the attacks in 1974, but the shift of locale to Beijing seems to attribute a higher level of significance to the subject than the previous provincial-level treatment.

(S/NF/NC/OC) The exhibition's opening coincided with the peak of the spiritual pollution campaign. One report in Beijing Ribao explicitly linked the exhibition to the campaign, calling the exhibit a "forceful refutation of abstract humanistic views." This obscure statement probably was inspired by a comment at the October Plenum by Deng, who reportedly referred to the massacre in the course of defending his record of opposition to Western ideas of humanitarianism and human rights.

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- 3 -

(C) The exhibition also coincided with Beijing's protests against the Pell resolution and the IFI appropriations bill which referred to Taiwan as the Republic of China. This may help to explain the emphasis on SACO, especially in the press reports. The exhibition may have been under preparation for some time, however. The massacre victims were proclaimed "revolutionary martyrs" last June as part of an ongoing rehabilitation of civil war participants vilified as traitors by the "Gang of Four."

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BGN gaz. China, 1979 (Ch°ung-ch°ing Shih;
Chongqing Shi; ADM2, 29.34N, 106.35E; Sichuan Sheng)
GEOnet, Aug. 19, 1998 (Chongqing, PPL
29 p0 s32'59"N 106 p0 s31'54"E; variants: Chongqing Shi,
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Yü-chou, Yuzhou); Chongqing Shi, ADM2 29 p0 s34'N
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Japanese outposts along the legendary Burma Road. Hoping to encourage the Chinese to greater efforts while avoiding heavy casualties in his own unit, Brig. Gen. John P. Willey, commander of the task force, avoided the main road, instead placing his men on the adjacent high ground. From there, they could interdict the road with patrols and artillery. Their communications cut by the guerrillas and Mars Task Force, the Japanese evacuated

Page 122

Lashio on 7 March, enabling the Allies to link the Ledo Road to the Burma Road and reopen the land route to China. 36

Although Peers had originally planned to deactivate Detachment 101 once the Burma Road had been reached, the critical situation in China and the diversion of Chinese and U.S. troops to that front caused theater headquarters to request that the Kachin battalions be retained. By this time many of the tribesmen were already hundreds of miles from their homes, some of which were threatened by Chinese bandits, but about 1,500 volunteered for a final offensive to secure the Burma Road by a general advance south. Joined by about 1,500 Karen, Gurkha, Shan, and Chinese volunteers, the Kachins, beginning in April 1945, infiltrated again into Japanese territory, established bases, and harassed Japanese communications, particularly the Taunggyi-Kentung Road along which Japanese troops were trying to escape to Thailand. By this time the remaining Japanese in the area were in poor condition, but their rear guards still fought hard in defense of fixed positions. In desperate fighting at Loilem, Lawksawk, and Pangtara, the Kachins, despite some air support, suffered their heaviest losses of the campaign. By mid-June, however, they had inflicted 1,200 casualties on the Japanese and had driven them from the Taunggyi-Kentung region, an achievement for which Detachment 101 later received the Distinguished Unit Citation. With the deactivation of the detachment on 12 July the native troops at last returned to their homes, and the Americans joined the growing OSS organization in China.37

The Office of Strategic Services in China

In the summer of 1945 the OSS effort in China was only beginning to become effective. During the first three years of the agency's involvement there, it had made little progress due to lack of resources, bureaucratic infighting, and the complexities of Chinese politics. Chiang's government, suspicious of any clandestine agency outside its control, limited its support to the joint Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO) under Tai Li, with Miles as deputy director. To gain entry into the theater, Donovan initially placed OSS activities in Asia under Miles, but the partnership never worked well. Miles was determined to be independent of Donovan's agency, which he perceived to be staffed with "old China hands" who could not

Page 123

Map 11: Mars Force, December 1944-March 1945

Page 124

deal with the Chinese as equals. The Office of Strategic Services, in turn, regarded Miles as the tool of Tai Li, who repeatedly blocked OSS efforts to establish an intelligence presence independent of the Nationalist regime. Seeking to free themselves from Miles, OSS operatives in China sought a patron in Maj. Gen. Claire L. Chennault of the U.S. Fourteenth Air Force, establishing the Air-Ground Forces Resources Technical Staff (AGFRTS) to collect intelligence and help downed fliers escape from behind Japanese lines. An OSS mission even investigated the possibility of supplying arms to Mao Tse-tung's Communists, who were conducting guerrilla warfare against the Japanese from bases in Yenan.38

The establishment of an independent OSS branch in China and the end of the war in Europe in early 1945 greatly facilitated the expansion of OSS operations. After assuming command of the new China Theater in October 1944, Maj. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer pushed hard for control over all U.S. clandestine

Page 125

Officers and men of the OSS who instructed Chinese commandos in parachute jumping and commando tactics at the commando training camp in Kunming, China (U.S. Army photograph)

tine operations in China. His arguments before the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Donovan's constant complaints to President Roosevelt of Chinese obstructionism finally resulted in the creation of an OSS agency independent of the Sino-American Cooperative Organization and under Wedemeyer's control. Meanwhile, the end of the war in Europe enabled the OSS to shift materiel, supplies, and personnel, including trained operational groups, to the Far East. By the summer of 1945 fourman OSS teams were training and leading large groups of Chinese partisans in operations against Japanese communications in southern China.³⁹

Even before the end of the war in Europe, OSS personnel had been attempting to organize Chinese commando forces for operations behind enemy lines. The idea apparently drew its inspiration from Wedemeyer, who, as a staff officer, had been involved in the formation of Darby's Rangers. Given the gener-

126

ally deplorable performance of Chiang's regular army in the field, the American theater commander hoped that smaller Chinese units, with intensive American training and guidance, might fight more effectively than the standard Chinese divisions. After some opposition, Chiang's government grudgingly agreed in February 1945 to provide about 4,000 troops, food, clothing, and equipment for a force of twenty commando units. Almost immediately, the project encountered problems. The Chinese soldiers failed to arrive at the training area in Kunming until mid-April, and the quality of those who finally came varied greatly. Not surprisingly, Chiang's generals gave little support to the effort. Nevertheless, with the Office of Strategic Services in China providing most of the supplies and equipment, the OSS instructors began a hurried eight-week course in weapons training, guerrilla tactics, and parachuting. By July three commando units, each containing about 150 Chinese and 20 American advisers, were ready for the field.⁴⁰

On balance, the program was a success but came too late in the war to have much of an impact. Under the operational control of the Chinese military command, the commandos were to attack communications, to capture significant operational objectives, to gather intelligence, and to protect key facilities from destruction by retreating Japanese forces. Although the commandos later suffered severe losses in the field, they exhibited a fighting spirit rare in the other Nationalist combat units, but lack of coordination and their subsequent misuse as line infantry were major problems. For example, during an assault by three commando units and the Chinese 265th Regiment on Tanchuk airfield, the OSS-trained forces seized high ground overlooking the airfield but took heavy casualties and were forced to withdraw when the 265th failed to arrive in time to support them. An attack on Taiyuanshih by another commando unit and local guerrillas also failed for similar reasons. Nevertheless, by the time the Japanese finally surrendered in August 1945, the commandos appeared to have become an effective fighting force. The Chinese Nationalist high command, however, continued to mistrust these American-inspired units and showed little grasp of their proper employment.⁴¹

Page 127

The Office of Strategic Services in Southeast Asia

In Southeast Asia, as in China, OSS plans to organize guerrillas were just reaching fruition when the war ended. Great distances, difficult unpredictable weather, native apathy, and U.S. ignorance of local conditions presented formidable obstacles. Furthermore, the British and French, with major colonial interests in the region, viewed with suspicion efforts to establish an independent intelligence service there. Nevertheless, after an OSS lieutenant reached Ho Chi Minh in Tonkin in May 1945, OSS headquarters in China sent a team under Maj. Allison Thomas to arm and train the Viet Minh guerrillas of Ho and Vo Nguyen Giap for service against the Japanese. The OSS men held training sessions for 200 of Giap's best troops and supplied the Viet Minh with rifles, mortars, machine guns, and grenades.

An OSS medic even cured Ho of a near fatal bout with malaria and dysentery. At the time of the Japanese surrender the Viet Minh were only beginning to establish their control over what later became Vietnam. Within twenty years they and the United States would meet again, under less auspicious circumstances.⁴²

Thailand represented an especially complex challenge for the Office of Strategic Services. Early in the war the Japanese had forced the Thai government into an alliance against the United States. At the time the Thai minister in Washington renounced the action and supported an OSS program training Thai students studying in the United States as a nucleus of agents to be infiltrated into Thailand. The Office of Strategic Services instructed the young Thais in radio, weapons, demolitions, and close combat and assigned Lt. Col. Nicol Smith to serve as their finance officer and quartermaster. Arriving at Chungking in the summer of 1943, the contingent soon encountered obstructionism from Tai Li and the Chinese secret service. By April 1944 OSS leaders were frantic to reach the Thai resistance ahead of the British, suspecting that the British would attempt to establish a protectorate in Thailand after the war. Smith hired a Chinese Catholic priest to guide his men across the border, but two were killed and the remainder vanished. In October, just as Smith and the remaining Thais were about to give up hope, one of the agents contacted them

Page 128

by radio from Bangkok. He had reached the Thai underground and found a substantial network of agents already in place. In response to a Thai request for U.S. officers to train guerrillas, the Office of Strategic Services in early 1945 parachuted personnel into the country and laid plans to train 10,000 guerrillas in twelve operating areas. Although the Thais expressed eagerness to fight the Japanese occupiers, their American advisers counseled them to wait until the Allied invasion of Thailand, scheduled for December 1945. Thus, the war ended before the Thai guerrillas saw action.⁴³

As in the Philippines American forces in the CBI Theater demonstrated the potential of special operations, particularly in Burma. Facing a shortage of manpower and supplies, U.S. commanders turned to such activities as a means of maximizing their available forces. Lacking resources or even a clear initial concept of operations, Detachment 101 through improvisation and trial and error proved its value. Providing intelligence, reconnaissance, and, finally, a powerful guerrilla army, its efforts were vital to the Allied success in northern Burma. U.S. commanders at first underestimated the potential of the detachment's efforts but quickly revised their judgments. An evaluation of the performance of GALAHAD is more difficult. Although technically no more than light infantry, the Marauders served as line units and suffered heavy losses. Given the lack of American combat forces and the extreme caution of the Chinese, Stilwell had no choice but to use them past the point of endurance to accomplish his mission. GALAHAD'S true raiding potential was never tested. The same might also be said of the OSS's belated attempts to organize guerrillas in China and Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, special operations, particularly those of Detachment 101, played a major role in the successes achieved by Allied arms in the China-Burma-India Theater.

Notes

1. Roosevelt, *War Report of the OSS*, 2: 369, 373; William C. Wilkinson, "Problems of a Guerrilla Leader," *Military Review* 32 (November 1952): 23; William R. Peers, "Guerrilla Operations in Northern Burma," *Military Review* 28 June 1948): 10-11; William R. Peers and Dean Brelis, *Behind the Burma Road: The Story of America's Most Successful Guerrilla Force* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963), pp. 47-49; Jack Barnard's report in Eifler to Donovan, 1 Jul 43, OSS, History Office Files, Entry 99, Box 49, Folder 400, RG 226, NARA.

2. William R. Peers, "Guerrilla Operations in Northern Burma," *Military Review* 28 June 1948): 11; Richard Dunlop, *Behind Japanese Lines: With the OSS in Burma* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1979), pp. 65-69; Rpt, Eifler to Donovan, 24 Nov 42, OSS, History Office Files, Entry 99, Box 49, Folder 400, Modern Military HQ Branch, RG 226, NARA. Donovan's original organization, the Office of the Coordinator of Information, became the Office of Strategic Services in June 1942.

3. Peers and Brelis, *Behind the Burma Road*, pp. 27-29; Dunlop, *Behind Japanese Lines*, pp. 76-80; Rpt, Eifler to Donovan, 24 Nov 42, OSS, History Office Files. Peers later rose to the rank of lieutenant general and commanded the 4th Infantry Division and II Field Force in Vietnam.

4. Dunlop, *Behind Japanese Lines*, pp. 83-87, 90; Peers and Brelis, *Behind the Burma Road*, pp. 30-35; Rpt, Eifler to Donovan, 24 Nov 42, OSS, History Office Files; USAMHI, Senior Officers Debriefing Program: Conversations Between Lieutenant General William R. Peers and Lieutenant Colonel Jim Breen, Lieutenant Colonel Charlie Moore, 5 sees. [Carlisle, 1977] (hereafter cited as Peers interview), 1: 13.

5. Quote from Dunlop, *Behind Japanese Lines*, p. 109; see also Milton E. Miles, *A Different Kind of War*, ed. Hawthorne Daniel (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967), pp. 76, 86, 90; Smith, OSS, pp. 244-45.

6. Rpt, Eifler to Donovan, 24 Nov 42, and Ltr, Maj L.B. Thompson, Asst Adj. General, CBI Branch Office, to Eifler, 15 Sep 42, both in OSS, History Office Files, Entry 99, Box 49, Folder 400, Modern Military HO Branch, RG 226, NARA; Roosevelt, *War Report of the OSS*, 2: 360-61, 369-71; Dunlop, *Behind Japanese Lines*, p. 109; Peers, "Guerrilla Operations in Northern Burma," *Military Review* 28 June 1948): 12; Miles, *A Different Kind of War*, p.

7. Rpt, Eifler to Donovan, 24 Nov 42, OSS, History Office Files; Dunlop, *Behind Japanese Lines*, pp. 111, 126; Peers and Brelis, *Behind the Burma Road*, p. 38; Peers interview, 1: 11.

8. Rpt, Eifler to Donovan, 24 Nov 42, OSS, History Office Files; Roosevelt, *War Report of the OSS*, 2: 372-73; Peers, "Guerrilla Operations in Northern Burma," 28 June 1948): 14-15; History of OSS Detachment 101, OSS, History Office Files, Entry 99, Box 50, Folder 403, RG 226, NARA; History of Communications for OSSSU Detachment 101, OSS, Special Forces, Entry 103, Box 1, Folder 1, RG 226, NARA; Peers and Brelis, *Behind the Burma Road*, pp. 60-63; Dunlop, *Behind Japanese Lines*, pp. 122-23, 132.

9. Dunlop, *Behind Japanese Lines*, pp. 142-43; Peers and Brelis, *Behind the Burma Road*, p. 67; Rpt, Eifler to Donovan, 24 Nov 42, OSS, History Office Files.

10. Peers and Brelis, *Behind the Burma Road*, p. 70; Dunlop, *Behind Japanese Lines*, pp. 147-48.

Page 130

11. See Jack Barnard's report, in Rpt, Eifler to Donovan, 1 Jul 43, and Eifler's monthly reports, both of OSS, History Office Files, Entry 99, Box 49, Folder 400, RG 226, NARA; Peers and Brelis, *Behind the Burma*, pp. 92, 96.

12. Rpt, Eifler to Donovan, 6 Apr 43, OSS, History Office Files, Entry 99, Box 49, Folder 400, RG 226, NARA; History of Detachment 101, in Rpt, Peers to Donovan, Nov 44, OSS, History Office Files, Entry 99, Box 50, Folder 403, RG 226, NARA; Roosevelt, *War Report of the OSS*, 2: 376-78; Peers and Brelis, *Behind the Burma Road*, pp. 100-101; Peers interview, 1: 2, 17; Dunlop, *Behind Japanese Lines*, pp. 204, 209- 11.

13. Rpt, Eifler to Donovan, 6 Apr 43, and Rpt, Eifler to Donovan, 30 Apr 43, both in OSS, History Office Files, Entry 99, Box 49, Folder 400, RG 226, NARA; Roosevelt, *War Report of the OSS*, 2: 370, 376; OSSSU Detachment 101: A Brief History of the Detachment for NCAC Records, Mar 45, OSS, History Office Files, Entry 99, Box 51, Folder 408, RG 226, NARA.

14. Peers, "Guerrilla Operations in Northern Burma," 28 July 1948): 16-17; Roosevelt, *War Report of the OSS*, 2: 372-73; Peers and Brelis, *Behind the Burma Road*, pp. 215- 16.

15. Wilkinson, "Problems of a Guerrilla Leader," pp. 23-28; Rpt, Eifler to Donovan, 6 Apr 43, OSS,

History Office Files; Dunlop, *Behind Japanese Lines*, pp. 191-92, 208, 368-70; Peers and Brelis, *Behind the Burma Road*, p. 13; Rpt, Wilkinson to Peers, 31 Dec 43, OSS, History Office Files, Entry 99, Box 50, Folder 402, RG 226, NARA; Rpt, Peers to Donovan, Nov 44, OSS, History Office Files.

16. Peers and Brelis, *Behind the Burma Road*, pp. 15-16; Dunlop, *Behind Japanese Lines*, pp. 213-20; Rpt, Peers to Donovan, Nov 44, OSS, History Office Files; Roosevelt, *War Report of the OSS*, 2: 377, 379; Eifler's monthly reports in OSS, History Office Files; Charles N. Hunter, *GALAHAD* (San Antonio, Tex.: Naylor, 1963), p. 54.

17. Rpt, Eifler to Donovan, 1 Aug 43, OSS, History Office Files, Entry 99, Box 49, Folder 400, RG 226, NARA; Dunlop, *Behind Japanese Lines*, p. 327; Rpt, Peers to Donovan, Nov 44, OSS, History Office Files; Peers, "Guerrilla Operations in Northern Burma," *Military Review* 28 July 1948): 14.

18. Charlton Ogburn, *The Marauders*, 2d ed. (New York: Harper & Bros., 1959), p. 103; Dunlop, *Behind Japanese Lines*, pp. 144, 311, 379, 392, 423-24, 435; Peers, "Guerrilla Operations in Northern Burma," *Military Review* 28 July 1948): 19; Peers and Brelis, *Behind the Burma Road*, p. 154.

19. Peers and Brelis, *Behind the Burma Road*, pp. 144-47; Peers, "Guerrilla Operations in Northern Burma," *Military Review* 28 July 1948): 17.

20. Roosevelt, *War Report of the OSS*, 2: 371, 381, 387; reports in OSS, History Office Files, Entry 99, Box 50, RG 226, NARA; OSSSU Detachment 101, Mar 45, OSS, History Office Files; Special Report on Activities of Detachment 101, OSS, in Relation to Air Force Action in North Burma, 11 Sep 44, and Ltr, R. Taylor Drake to Lt Col Carl O. Hoffman, 26 Sep 44, both in OSS, History Office Files, Entry 99, Box 51, Folder 408, RG 226, NARA; Peers and Brelis, *Behind the Burma Road*, pp. 107-09, 122, 213, 219; Dunlop, *Behind Japanese Lines*, p. 281; Peers interview, 1: 1.

21. Roosevelt, *War Report of the OSS*, 2: 374, 380-82; Eifler's and Peers' reports in OSS, History Office Files, Entry 99, Boxes 49 and 50, respectively, RG 226, NARA; Peers, "Guerrilla Operations in Northern Burma," *Military Review* 28 July 1948): 19; Wilkinson, "Problems of a Guerrilla Leader," p. 25; Dunlop, *Behind Japanese Lines*, p. 223; Peers and Brelis, *Behind the Burma Road*, pp. 110, 129.

Page 131

22. Roosevelt, *War Report of the OSS*, 2: 380-81; Peers, "Guerrilla Operations in Northern Burma," *Military Review* 28 July 1948): 12; Dunlop, *Behind Japanese Lines*, pp. 248, 255-62, 269; Peers and Brelis, *Behind the Burma Road*, pp. 131-39; Peers interview, 1: 14.

23. QUADRANT Conference, August 1943: Papers and Minutes of Meetings (Office of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 1943), pp. 254, 336, 427-28, CMH; Ronald H. Spector, *Eagle Against the Sun* (New York: Free Press, 1985), pp. 347-48, 355; Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, U.S. Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, Government Printing Office, 1955), pp. 36, 222; Winston S. Churchill, *Closing the Ring* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951), pp. 67-68; Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory* (New York: Viking, 1973), pp. 256-57.

24. Quoted from Ogburn, *Marauders*, p. 34.

25. Ibid., pp. 9, 29-43, 271; U.S. War Department, *Merrill's Marauders, February-May 1944*, American Forces in Action series (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1945), pp. 8-11.

26. Ogburn, *Marauders*, pp. 52-56, 61, 72; Hunter, *GALAHAD*, p. 12.

27. Ogburn, *Marauders*, pp. 16, 59-60, 64, 70; War Department, *Merrill's Marauders*, pp. 8, 16; Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, p. 131; Riley Sunderland comments relating to "Common Man, Uncommon Leadership: Colonel Charles N. Hunter with GALAHAD in Burma," *Paras...eters* (Summer 1986), pp. 6-7 in Scott R. McMichael Papers, USAMHI.

28. Ogburn, *Marauders*, pp. 85-134; Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, pp. 149-54, 212; Hunter, *GALAHAD*, pp. 19-46. Hunter claimed that march to Shingbwiayang was necessary to condition the troops, but Peers stated later that he warned Hunter that the march would use up stores of energy which would be essential in the coming campaign. See Hunter, *GALAHAD*, pp. 19-20; Sunderland Comments to "Common Man, Uncommon Leadership," p. 6; Dunlop, *Behind Japanese Lines*, p. 300.

29. Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, p. 182.

30. Ogburn, *Marauders*, pp. 135-41, 177, 188-228; Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, pp. 175-91, 223-25; Hunter, *GALAHAD*, pp. 52-89.

31. Ogburn, *Marauders*, pp. 229-30.

32. Ogburn, *Marauders*, pp. 227-35, 244, 250-61, 278-83; Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, pp. 204, 223-56; Hunter, *GALAHAD*, pp. 99, 115-17, 127, 131, 136, 200-202; James H. Stone, "The Marauders and the Microbes," *Infantry Journal* 64 (March 1949): 8; Sunderland comments to "Common Man, Uncommon Leadership," pp. 8-12.

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34. See reports for Nov and Dec 1944 in OSS, History Office Files, Entry 99, Box 50, RG 226, NARA; OSSSU Detachment 101, Mar 45, OSS, History Office Files; Roosevelt, *War Report of the OSS*, 2: 388; Peers, "Guerrilla Operations in Northern Burma," *Military Review* 28 July 1948): 14; Dunlop, *Behind Japanese Lines*, pp. 315, 372-73; Peers and Brelis, *Behind the Burma Road*, pp. 173-84.

Page 132

35. See report for Jan 45 in OSS, History Office Files, Entry 99, Box 50, RG 226, NARA; OSSSU Detachment 101, Mar 45, OSS, History Office Files; Roosevelt, *War Report of the OSS*, 2: 388-90; Peers, "Guerrilla Operations in Northern Burma," *Military Review* 28 July 1948): 14; Dunlop, *Behind Japanese Lines*, pp. 326, 416-23; Peers and Brelis, *Behind the Burma Road*, pp. 57, 18391.

36. Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Time Runs Out in CBI*, U.S. Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, Government Printing Office, 1958), pp. 126, 134, 183-214.

37. Peers, "Guerrilla Operations in Northern Burma," *Military Review* 28 July 1948): 14-16; Roosevelt, *War Report of the OSS*, 2: 390-92; Peers interview, 2: 9-10; Peers and Brelis, *Behind the Burma Road*, pp. 193-211; Dunlop, *Behind Japanese Lines*, pp. 430-33, 435-36. The Mars Task Force was deactivated in China at about the same time. See John H. Randolph, *Marsmen in Burma* (Houston: Gulf Publishing, 1946), pp. 218-19.

38. Roosevelt, *War Report of the OSS*, 2: 359-64, 415-17; Miles, *A Different Kind of War*, pp. 85, 91, 111, 117, 160, 436; Smith, *OSS*, pp. 250, 257, 26065, 268, 284.

39. Roosevelt, *War Report of the OSS*, 2: 364, 417-18, 440-47; Miles, *A Different Kind of War*, pp. 433-41, 455, 476; Smith, *OSS*, p. 266; Albert C. Wedemeyer, *Wedemeyer Reports!* (New York: Holt, 1958), pp. 252-53, 271.

40. Roosevelt, *War Report of the OSS*, 2: 417, 443, 454-55; see OSS/China monthly reports in OSS, History Office Files, Entry 99, Boxes 65-66, RG 226, NARA; Memorandum of Information to the JCS,

10 Aug 45, OSS, History Office Files, Entry 99, Box 68, Folder 218, RG 226, NARA.

41. Operational group monthly reports and the Nanking Mission in Folders 207 and 208, OSS Activities China, 11 Jun 45, and Memorandum of Information for the JCS, 30 Aug 45, Sub: OSS Special Operations in China, Folder 211, all in OSS, History Office Files, Entry 99, Boxes 65-66, RG 226, NARA.

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43. Smith, *OSS*, pp. 296-314; see also Nicol Smith, *Into Siam* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1945).

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Abstract: The Sino-American Special Technical Cooperative Organization (SACO), established during World War II, was jointly operated by the American military and the Chinese secret police. SACO, by Japan's surrender in 1945, had trained thousands of Chinese troops, collected intelligence, inflicted casualties, destroyed enemy property, and helped prepare US troops to land on China's coast. The article shows how SACO has been remembered in the United States and Taiwan, and it discusses SACO as a central controversy between the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party. Both sides have molded, changed, and rewritten the history of SACO to serve their own ends. It was used by American naval commander Milton Miles and his officers to exaggerate the positive effects SACO had on Chinese resistance to the Japanese during the war. It was also used by the Republic of China (ROC) to improve US-ROC relations in the 1950's-60's and to try to maintain those relations when US-People's Republic of China (PRC) relations improved after 1970. Most effectively, the Chinese Communist Party used SACO's history to further indict the Nationalist regime after 1949, to help rally nationalist feeling during the Korean War, and to help fight reform after 1950 each time the PRC seemed to move toward a capitalist economy.
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